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Abstract:  
As a continent dedicated to peace and science, the role of politics and international 
relations is sometimes perceived to play a secondary role in Antarctica. To the 
contrary, this article argues that political and diplomatic considerations at the 
forefront of state interaction on ‘the ice.’ In doing so, the article uses traditional 
International Relations frameworks to analyse the actions of China, the United States 
and New Zealand in Antarctica over the last 10-15 years. An assessment of the three 
dominant theoretical traditions: Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism, alongside 
an examination of some of the key questions facing Antarctic geopolitics today, will 
enable a synthesis of theory and action within some major political debates. The 
promotion of Constructivism as the most convincing theoretical framework through 
which to view these Antarctic actions is largely due to the importance of national 
identity in each nation’s Antarctic presence. Ultimately, the rise of China in both 
world and Antarctic politics presents distinct challenges to more traditional leaders 
like the US (and to some extent New Zealand) and could potentially threaten the 
established hierarchy that has for so long maintained peace in Antarctica. 
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World politics reflects an environment of competing, clashing, and cooperating 
ideas.1 In many ways, Antarctic geopolitics is no different. Despite a relatively short 
historical relationship with humans – it was only around 250 years ago that 
Antarctica was first sighted, and with the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 a 
political and legal realm was created – international activity in Antarctica has given 
rise to a number of unusual dynamics and challenges for the global political 
community.2 International relations (IR) theory looks to frame state motivations and 
behaviour in the context of normative theoretical traditions; in doing so, IR theory 
aims to explain and predict how and why actors in the international system behave 
the way they do. This article will assess Antarctic geopolitics within an IR theory 
framework and through a three-part approach. The first section will outline the three 
dominant theoretical traditions in IR theory today (Realism, Liberalism, and 
Constructivism) and assess the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. The 
second section will cover the contemporary Antarctic foreign policy approaches of 
three nations: China, the United States, and New Zealand, providing a brief analysis 
of each nation’s Antarctic activity. The third section will look to synthesise IR theory 
with information from these case study nations, addressing central questions in 
Antarctic geopolitics today. In doing so, the article will promote Constructivism as 
the most convincing theoretical tradition to explain state behaviour, due to its multi-
utility approach and inclusion of normative considerations within the political realm 
of contemporary Antarctica.3 
Theoretical Discussion 
	
International relations theory is the study of international relations from a theoretical 
perspective, which aims to present a simplified picture of the interactions between 
states and other actors in the international system.4 In attempting to provide a 
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conceptual framework in which to view international actions and relations, each 
theoretical tradition places different weight on what matters, and ascribes a series of 
assumptions and values to the actions being analysed.5 In this sense, “‘assumptions’ 
are postulates relied on as part of a theory's foundation, which the theory itself does 
not account for or explain”. 6 This allows analytical discussions to move beyond 
elementary debates and engage in a more complex and dynamic analysis of state 
actions and interaction. As a result, each framework hopes to “bring order and 
meaning to a mass phenomena that without it would remain disconnected and 
unintelligible”.7 
 
The three most prominent theoretical traditions in the international relations domain 
are Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, and are the three frameworks that will 
be explored in relation to Antarctic geopolitics throughout this article. Why apply 
general IR theory to Antarctic geopolitics? As noted above, the value of this approach 
lies in the analysis these frameworks enable. Each theoretical tradition makes a 
number of different assumptions about the political environment which shapes the 
way the theory explains the behaviour of actors. The assumptions and features that 
each theory sets out lays down certain parameters within which to organise state and 




Classical Realism (or Realism) is one of the founding theoretical traditions within IR 
thought, dominating the study of IR for the past 70 years.9 Realism is closely 
associated with the term Realpolitik – a German term describing ‘pragmatism in 
politics’ – with both approaches based on the pursuit of power in an anarchic 
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international system.10 Early thinkers in political theory such as Niccolo Machiavelli 
and Thomas Hobbes characterised the Realist tradition, through The Prince and The 
Leviathan’s occupations with the acquisition and maintenance of power, and a 
negative view of mankind as inherently self-centred and anarchistic; “…and because 
the condition of man is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which 
case every one is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use 
of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies”.11 These 
views make a number of negative assumptions about human nature and behaviour. 
Despite this pessimistic outlook, Realism has proven a highly useful theoretical 
paradigm for political analysis, as best exhibited by Hans Morgenthau’s seminal 1948 
essay, Politics Among Nations.12  
 
Classical Realism assumes that human nature is inherently egoist, selfish, power-
hungry, and ambitious.13 It also assumes that states are unitary actors and are the most 
important actor in international politics.14 According to realism, anarchy is the 
presiding condition of the international system, and with no overarching authority to 
constrain the interests of individual states or binding legal standard for which actors 
must follow, fear is endemic to interstate relations. As a consequence, the 
fundamental concern for states is security, survival, and the acquisition of power, 
which highlights the “primacy of self-interest and power in the relations among 
states”.15 Hans Morgenthau observes that there is no objective or universal morality, 
as morality is specific to the state (raison d’etat), and therefore asserts that politics 
would ideally be kept distinct from the moral sphere.16 States inherently possess a 
certain amount of offensive military capability and are therefore capable of harming 
one another. Through these military capabilities, Morgenthau argues that states can 
affect and change the ‘balance of power’ within the international system. 17 
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International political cooperation is possible, but limited, whereby alliances tend to 
be nothing more than transient marriages of convenience. 18  
 
In Classical Realism, two important distinctions should be made. First, while 
Morgenthau’s Realist politics is loosely defined as ‘interests defined as power’, he 
himself felt the need to clarify political interests’ ability to change and develop. The 
material weight attached to Realist interpretations of modern IR is in many cases 
misinterpreted, as Morgenthau reasserts:  
The misunderstanding of the central element of power, which, after having been 
underrated to the point of total neglect, now tends to be equated with material 
strength, especially of a military nature, I have stressed more than before its 
immaterial aspects, especially in the form of charismatic power, and have elaborated 
the discussion of political ideologies.19 
This point highlights the salient nature of Realism’s ‘hard power’ and negates the 
instrumentalist and material associations’ critics have attached to the Realist tradition. 
This interpretation also allows for Realist concepts of interests and power to develop 
and accommodate state actions in a changing international political environment. 
Second, despite arguments that statehood is in decline, the Realist assumption of 
states as primary actors carries equal weight today as laid out by Morgenthau in 1948. 
Ultimately, states remain the fundamental agents of change in the global political 
system – mere membership of the largest international organisation in the world 
proves this point; to gain full membership to the United Nations (UN), a party must 
primarily be recognised as state.20 While the influence of Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) are undoubtedly growing, the 
primary actors (and the motivations of those actions) remain state-centric and in the 
pursuit of power21. These distinctions cannot comprehensively account for every 
eventuality in the international system, but in re-clarifying some of Morgenthau’s 
central points in regards to the motivations and outcomes of state behaviour in the 
Realist tradition, we can more accurately assess its assumptions in an Antarctic 
geopolitical setting.  
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Critics of Realism point to a number of issues within the Realist tradition and argue 
that the ‘hard power’ framework no longer adequately explains IR behaviour in a 
rapidly changing international environment. Further, critics note that classical 
Realism is inadequately structural and theoretical in today’s international 
environment.22 The state-centric approach of realism arguably ignores the more 
recent proliferation of non-state actors – whether it be MNCs, NGOs, or regional 
institutions – in the modern international system, increasingly challenging this Realist 
classification of the international system as a state-centric environment.23 Further, 
critics assert that a Realist perspective cannot account for new developments in the 
system, such as regional integration, humanitarian intervention or changing economic 
and social norms. Realism is therefore considered inflexible to modern international 
change and inadequate in explaining state behaviour under the contemporary 
demands of IR theory.24  
 
Liberalism 	
Liberal theorists’ perceive international relations as a “potential realm of progress and 
purposive change”, with substantial faith placed in the ability of human rationality 
and reason to facilitate harmony and cooperation in international affairs.25 This 
generally optimistic view of human nature places fundamental importance on liberty, 
where moral values and legal norms play a crucial role in international politics.26 
While the those in the Liberal tradition concede that the international system is 
anarchic, they argue that the effects of anarchy can be mitigated by the spread of 
democracy, the rule of international law, commerce, and institutions. This is because 
Liberals perceive that social and political evils are not a given of the human condition 
and therefore can be remedied to mediate the causes of conflict. Principles like 
freedom, human rights, rationality, progress, and toleration alongside the central 
central pillars of constitutionalism and democracy reinforce the idea that “where a 
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liberal economic order prevails, states will be less inclined to use force in their 
relations with each other than would otherwise be the case”.27  
 
Early thinkers of Liberalism include numerous names familiar to political philosophy: 
John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. Immanuel Kant is widely 
considered as one of the most influential modern thinkers, with his work Perpetual 
Peace considered the ‘standard bearer’ of Liberal thought in international relations 
studies.28 Kant’s development of the Liberal philosophy in particular relation to 
democratic governance and its relationship with international peace has been both 
widely cited and analysed since its publication in 1795.29 His influence on the broader 
themes of Liberalism – economic and political interdependence creating benefits for 
those involved with free trade, institutionalism facilitating forums for interaction and 
problem-solving – remain central to the Liberal argument in IR theory.30 
 
In defending the strengths and advantages of the Liberal tradition, Liberals point to 
the lack of significant world conflict since the middle of the 20th century, noting that 
during this time, economic growth and political interdependence has correlated with 
changing forms of conflict. The proliferation of international organisations and 
institutions alongside the emergence of a global economic market has arguably had a 
robust role in affecting the nature and frequency of international conflict.31 While it 
may be true that the impacts of economic structures on international security are 
subordinate to the use of force, the role they play in stabilising the international 
system is an important and truly contemporary one.32. The United Nations has played 
a vital role in shaping international ideals on basic human rights and subsequently 
creating ‘market norms’ by which states are relatively compelled to adhere to.33 In 
this way, state perceptions of raisons d’état have developed to encourage state actors 
to subordinate state authority and independence in favour of multilateral norms and 
procedures. Those who argue that a Liberal system is inherently unstable overlook 
																																																								
27 Buzan, B. (1984). Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case. 
International Organization, 38(04), p. 598. 
28 Walker, T. (2008). Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine, and the Question of Intervention. 
International Studies Quarterly, 52(3), p. 451. 
29 Kant, I. (1795). Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, p. 133. 
30 Ibid, 452. 
31 Walker, Two Faces of Liberalism, p. 451. 
32 Griffiths, Solomon, and Roach, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, p. 120.	
33 Grieco, Ikenberry, and Mastanduno, Theories of International Relations, p. 81. 
the founding Liberal perspective that social and political evils are not a given, simply 
a possibility in the absence of reputable multinational structures. Liberalism looks to 
facilitate and support these kinds of institutions in the contemporary IR system. 
 
Critics of Liberalism brand the framework as a Utopian and unrealistic view of the 
international system, whereby considerations of power are completely ignored. They 
argue that the system’s moral values and legal norms (created by interdependence and 
democracy) not only underestimate the strength and importance of diverging 
ethnicities, culture, religion, and nationalism in the international system, but also 
predominantly reflect the perspective of those located at the top of the power 
hierarchy.34  Liberal arguments on the peaceful power of democracy reflect an 
unquestionable acceptance of subtle but prevailing liberal western norms in the 
existing system, an inherently problematic approach for those whose ideals do not 
align. The economic basis of Liberal’s interdependence argument creates a similarly 
weak case. The spread of a Liberal economic structure has neither a robust nor 
unconditional constraining effect on the use of force.35 In this way: 
Security considerations therefore cannot be used convincingly either as a major support 
for maintaining the contemporary international economic system or as a decisive point 
against moving towards a more mercantilist structure of international economic 
relations.36  
These observations highlight the limiting factors to the Liberal argument despite 
an increasingly interdependent international system. 
 
(Structural) Constructivism	
Structural Constructivism (or Constructivism) is based on assumptions about the 
nature of actors in the international system, the context in which they operate, and the 
way in which they interact, predominantly focusing on the social interactions of 
agents and actors in world politics.37 Like Realists and Liberals, Constructivists agree 
that the international system is anarchical (i.e. that actors exist in the political context 
of anarchy). However, Constructivists argue that states are not the only actors in the 
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system; International Governmental Organisations (IGOs), NGOs, MNCs, and social 
movements are influential and can affect change.38 Central thinkers of structural 
Constructivism include Nicholas Onuf and Alexander Wendt, who claim, “national 
interests are constructed through processes of social interaction, in which states 
affected by and responding to norms, identities, and cultures in their domestic and 
global contexts define their national interest”.39 This observation emphasises the 
social aspects of international politics (ideas, rules, norms, meanings) over the 
material aspects (military and economic strength), and highlights a unique factor in 
the Constructivist approach.  
 
This role of social construction means that Constructivist actors do not have a fixed 
nature but are dynamic and fluid over time, as their perception of interests is based on 
their identity. Change can also be based on the international context. Different actors 
may have different ideas and values, and these can change over time, as arguably 
states value things other than power and security, such as human rights. 
Consequently, this transient nature also occurs in the context of the international 
system, as when the actors behave differently, they prove that they are not captive to 
their broader environment.40 Identity can be constructed within a domestic context, 
through repeated patterns of interaction and in the larger social context in which an 
actor operates. The context – which is not an objective reality but something which 
has been constructed – shapes behaviour by dictating what is considered right or 
wrong, and possible or impossible. As it follows, actors have agency in constructing 
their own social contexts.41 Different types of interaction between actors can lead to 
different types of identity, interests, and behaviours, and this change in interaction 
can lead to changes in behaviour.42  
 
This ability for change and development in the international system is both a critique 
and a response to what Constructivists view as the static and material assumptions of 
more traditional IR theories. In focussing on the social construction of the conditions 
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that motivate actors’ behaviour, Constructivism enriches the study of world politics 
by placing more emphasis on ‘the why’ and less-so on ‘the what’. In turn, these 
agents play a central role in the production and reproduction of reality in the 
international system.43 Crucially, Constructivism does not reject key aspects of 
Realism and Liberalism, like the existence of anarchy in the international system and 
states desires for economic power and defence security, instead it contends that they 
exist within a state of social construction. In this way, this “bizarre” amalgamation of 
theories is essentially a broad theoretical criterion derived from the existing IR 
theories.44 Consequently, Constructivists assert that they can more comprehensively 
account for the dimensions of contemporary foreign policy than more traditional IR 
theory approaches. 
 
Three main criticisms dominate the debate in the Constructivist tradition. First, that 
the general methodology is problematic because it is intangible; questions arise 
around how analysts can even identify shared norms if they are by nature culturally 
and socially distinct and subject to change over time.45 This criticism reflects a ‘how-
possible’ approach that queries the representations of actors and their behaviour in the 
international system. It essentially asks: how the subjects, objects, and interpretive 
dispositions were socially constructed such that certain normative practices are at all 
possible. The mere possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to 
imagine certain courses of action and therefore proves that some normative values 
must already be constructed within the system to influence actors and their practices 
in the first place.46 Second, that the emphasis on the transferability of ideas and norms 
inevitably undersells the importance of material conditions. Historical events prove 
that narrative can be overwhelmed by physical reality despite the ‘alleged’ 
perspectives of the actors involved. And third, that while constructivism may be good 
at explaining change, it is conversely insufficient at accounting for stasis and stability 
within the international system when it occurs.47 
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Review of Contemporary Foreign Policy in Antarctica	
 
Conditions are regularly changing in the Antarctic environment, reflecting the 
constant development of the political environmental. In identifying the contemporary 
geopolitical approaches of China, the United States, and New Zealand, this article 
looks to assess each state’s foreign policy and activity in the Antarctic region. The 
research predominantly focuses on each country’s approach to scientific research in 
the region over the last 10-15 years for two reasons. The first is to lay down some 
logical informational parameters, and the second is due to scientific activity in 
Antarctica’s intrinsic links to Antarctic geopolitics. 48  Since the signing of the 
Antarctic Treaty in 1959, Antarctica has been a continent “devoted to peace and 
science”.49 This commitment to peace and science significantly limited the range of 
appropriate activities that states could commit in Antarctica, and consequently raised 
the currency of science to that of paramount importance.50 Shirley Scott identifies this 
use of ‘science’ to legitimise Antarctic actions, with a reconfigured goal of states not 
to govern, but to use the Antarctic continent.51 Scientific activity today by each 
country’s national programs represents this legitimation of presence for states on the 
ice, and is a key aspect of each nation’s foreign policy and international behaviour 
within the international relations framework. 
 
China	
Since 2005, China has transformed its engagement with, and political approach to 
Antarctica, dramatically increasing both its domestic expenditure and presence on the 
continent itself.52 In 2005, work began on a third Chinese base situated in Dome 
Argus, while the two existing bases received significant upgrades. During the last 10 
years, China has also set up a new research and logistics base in Beijing, and 
launched plans for an icebreaker vessel and two ice-capable planes.53 This increased 
																																																								
48 Howkins, A. (2011). Melting Empires? Climate Change and Politics in Antarctica since the 
International Geophysical Year. Osiris, 26(1), p.181. 
49 Howkins, Melting Empires, p. 185. 
50 Gilbert, N. (2015). A Continent for Peace and Science: Governance in Antarctica. In: D. Liggett, B. 
Storey, Y. Cook and V. Meduna, ed., Exploring the Last Continent: An Introduction to Antarctica, 1st 
ed. Cham: Springer, p.331. 
51 Scott, The Political Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties, p.77. 
52 Brady, A. (2012). Emerging Politics of Antarctica. 1st ed. London: Taylor and Francis, p.31. 
53 Brady, A. (2010). China's Rise in Antarctica?. Asian Survey, 50(4), p.759. 
presence, spending, and overall approach towards Antarctic activity reflects the 
general trend of a rapidly developing China, which represents the country’s growing 
economic and political power. Since 2010 China has been the world’s second largest 
economy, with the recent global economic downturn only accentuating its growing 
presence in international affairs generally, and Antarctica more specifically.54 A 
longer-term observation of China’s increasing presence in Antarctic affairs notes the 
shift in Chinese priorities towards Antarctic research from as early as 1990, but 
Anne-Marie Brady argues that China has only begun to seek leadership roles in 
Antarctic politics since 2005.55  
 
Currently, there appears to exist a gulf between China’s institutionalised and practical 
involvement in Antarctic politics. Allegedly ‘shut out’ of initial negotiations of the 
Antarctic Treaty in 1959 by the US (due to the country’s communist leanings), China 
has struggled to foster institutionalised involvement since.56 China then “became a 
consultative member to the Treaty in 1985, and joined the Scientific Committee for 
Antarctic Research (SCAR) in 1986”, and more recently acceded to the Convention 
on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in 2006, 
becoming a full consultative member in 2007.57 While this progress indicates China’s 
commitment to the current governing system, Chinese-language scholars and media 
analysis have been openly critical of the status quo in Antarctic politics, labelling the 
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) an ‘old boys club’ that favours the interests of 
Western Liberal democracy.58 This disapproval indicates that if China’s involvement 
and influence in Antarctica continues to grow, it would not only look to defend its 
interests and keep up with other Antarctic nations, but also take diplomatic steps to 
potentially redress the system’s current power balance.59 
 
The political issues Chinese representatives identify – feeling on the outer rim of the 
ATS power structure, appearing to have vastly different interests around the available 
mineral resources in Antarctica, and what appears to be a particularly defensive 
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stance towards other National Antarctic Programs (NAPs) – align well with China’s 
perceived challenges in the wider international system. 60  While China has 
consistently referenced economic growth and political stability as its core interests in 
the international system, in reality, this rhetoric thinly veils “China’s drive to remake 
global norms [which is] fuelled by a resurgent nationalism that hearkens back to the 
days when China was a world trading power”.61 In this way, the motivations driving 
both China’s international foreign policy and its Antarctic policy are the same. 
Recognising the role of Chinese nationalism in the state’s foreign policy objectives is 
crucial to unpick China's dual notions of nation building and the attainment of great 
power status, and the way it has injected an assertive tone into Chinese actions in 
Antarctica and further afield.62 Despite significant increases in scientific activity and 
investment in spending, China is still perceived as a moderate power in Antarctic 
politics. Realists note that the balance of power would have to shift in order for China 
to achieve its aims in challenging US hegemony in Antarctica.63 If a power shift were 
to occur, this may not necessarily equate to conflict, and while China’s Antarctic 
presence is increasing, it is still a long way from genuinely challenging the current 
power structures in place. Whether power politics are in fact a zero-sum game the 
way Realists claim they are also remains to be seen. 
 
The United States of America	
The United States (US) has been a central actor in the Antarctic geopolitical system 
since the original signing of the Antarctic Treaty. Though it does not have a territorial 
claim, the US was directly involved in the 1959 Treaty negotiations and thus secured 
the right to “maintain a basis of claim” to Antarctica, essentially establishing 
American involvement at the heart of Antarctic politics.64 Today, US interests lie in 
preserving the ‘agree to disagree’ legal status of territorial claims in Antarctica, 
reflecting perhaps the country’s currently advantageous position within the ATS.65 
The United States Antarctic Program’s (USAP) robust commitment to Antarctic 
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science is demonstrated by America’s three permanent year-round research stations, 
and the use of two scientific research vessels.66 The overall annual expenditure from a 
2010 report shows USAP spending at US$387 million, a substantial amount more 
than the other NAPs operating that year, which provides a reliable indicator of the 
general annual expenditure of USAP.67 In political terms, this resource and financial 
commitment reasserts America’s strategic and scientific priorities, and its awareness 
of its position as a hegemonic power in the current Antarctic system.  
 
Not unlike China, the US frames nationalist ideologies in their commitment to 
Antarctic research, and by association, politics. American exceptionalism as a 
national identity has been a mainstay in US foreign policy since the advent of the 
Second World War, as they assumed a position as ‘leader of the free world’. This 
constructed an identity of America as exceptional in its blessing of liberty and 
republicanism.68 The US has arguably carried this exceptionalism through to their 
policies and activities on the ice, and the peace and stability achieved by the status 
quo of the ATS as a whole, plays a key role in reinforcing their hegemonic status.  
 
For the maintenance of their core national interests in Antarctica, the US looks to:  
1. Maintain the Antarctic as a region of international cooperation that is reserved 
exclusively for peaceful purposes 
2. Preserve and undertake unique opportunities for scientific research in order to 
better comprehend both Antarctica’s and the earth’s geophysical and environmental 
systems  
3. Protect the relatively pristine environment of Antarctica and its associated 
ecosystems  
4. Ensure the conservation and sustainable management of living resources in the 
southern circumpolar ocean69 
Embracing these national interests in relation to the ATS is underscored by the 
recognition of the US that the continued stability of the ATS simultaneously props up 
their own position in the Antarctic power dynamic, which is something they are 
undoubtedly eager to preserve. 
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The strategic importance of USAP’s Amundsen-Scott south-pole station lies in its 
geographic positioning. The station is located on the “summit of the polar ice cap and 
at the point of intersection of the territorial claims that the US does not recognise”.70 
This precise location means that the US permanently occupies the apex of Antarctica, 
a symbolically powerful location where all the territorial claims (aside from 
Norway’s) converge on the continent. 71  The location of the south-pole station 
presents a striking example of American exceptionalism through national identity in 
the Antarctic. American exceptionalism has taken on many meanings throughout the 
20th century, but is best described as “the special and unique role the United States is 
meant to play in world history, its distinctiveness from the Old World, and its 
resistance to the laws of history”.72 This powerful and persistent social construction 
has unquestionably played a role in navigating US foreign policy in Antarctica in 
recent history. The symbolic notions the location of the Amundsen-Scott station 
reinforce the idea that the US actively engages in the construction and reconstruction 




As a largely peripheral nation in world politics, New Zealand’s position as a ‘leading 
Antarctic state’ developed (in many ways) out of a combination of happy factors. 
Unlike China and the US, New Zealand has strong geographic links with the 
Antarctica as one of five gateway cities to the continent. Additionally, Antarctica’s 
geographic environment, and any changes that occur, are quite literally felt in New 
Zealand’s oceanic and land-based domains.73 New Zealand’s territorial and political 
links to the continent are therefore a direct result of its proximity. The country’s 
tenuous legal rights to territory in Antarctica are inextricably linked to New Zealand’s 
colonial past, based on an arrangement that New Zealand (which was at the time a 
colony of Britain) would ‘govern’ the Ross Sea Dependency. This finally became a 
New Zealand claim in 1983, as a result of New Zealand becoming legally 
independent from Britain and defining the Ross Sea territory as part of the ‘realm of 
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New Zealand’.74 Despite some initial political reluctance to the Ross Dependency 
claim between 1950 and 1970, a strong contemporary awareness of the scientific and 
strategic value of New Zealand’s claim in Antarctica has emerged.75  
 
Scott Base is New Zealand’s sole year-round base located on Ross Island in the Ross 
Dependency, averaging populations of 70-85 people in summer and 11-15 during 
winter. Estimates indicate that 45%-50% of the total personnel travelling to 
Antarctica and Scott base through the New Zealand program each season are 
scientists.76 This demonstrates that for New Zealand, science and research is a clear 
priority. Most of the Antarctica New Zealand’s (ANZ) air support is provided by the 
US Air Force, and is viewed as substantial opportunity for and assistance with 
operations occurring both in Christchurch and Antarctica. 77  This cooperative 
relationship reinforces the importance not only of New Zealand’s working 
relationship with the USAP, but also the value in Christchurch as a gateway city to 
ANZ’s scientific, political and strategic interests in Antarctica. Further, more 
contemporary positions on New Zealand’s foreign policy indicate a growing 
emphasis on the breath of the country’s security interests.78 As a leading nation in the 
Asia-Pacific region, New Zealand’s bilateral links to Australia have traditionally 
equated to a role of maintaining security in the northern areas of the region; however, 
changing geopolitical attitudes in the late 1980s reflected the perception that 
Antarctica was also becoming a central factor in New Zealand’s area of strategic 
concern.79 For the first time, New Zealand foreign policy began to see both the Asia-
Pacific and South Pacific as regions where New Zealand had a role to play, and this 
has had contemporary implications for Antarctica and the Ross Sea Region.80 
 
The political implications of New Zealand’s Antarctic research, physical presence, 
and institutional involvement in the ATS represents an unusually powerful political 
position for the country. Because of this, New Zealand is unsurprisingly keen to 
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maintain the current balance of power that in many ways conflates the country’s 
perceived diplomatic capabilities outside of their realistic parameters.81 It is also 
essential for New Zealand to maintain its credibility as Antarctic nation and treaty 
party by continuing to engage in high quality science in the Ross Sea Region, and 
also gain leadership positions within the ATS.82 Political alignment with the US and 
in direct conflict to China means that New Zealand too relies on the structures of the 
ATS to reinforce the support of its territorial claim and presence in Antarctica, and 
therefore has a stronger interest than most nations to maintain the continuance of the 
Antarctic Treaty and its associated political systems.83 Diplomatically, this position 
speaks to the advantages New Zealand’s Antarctic connections afford to national 
representatives across the globe. Domestically, geographic and historic links to 
Antarctica are felt by New Zealanders in a personal manner, and this builds on the 
symbolic importance and nationalist pride of Antarctic activity undertaken by the 
small south pacific nation.84  
 
Despite each nation possessing distinct institutional linkages, historical relationships, 
and political interests with Antarctica, all three see the continent as a place where 
geopolitics remains a powerful and changeable currency. Through the co-option of 
scientific research, China, the US, and New Zealand all perceive themselves as 
playing an important political role in the future. Crucially, nationalism plays a part in 
defining each country’s strategic interests, whereby each nation’s foreign policy 
strategy is in some part derived from its own notions of nationalism. This results in 
nationally distinct foreign policy approaches aimed at both protecting security 
interests and shaping an environment conducive to each different nation’s interests 
and future goals.85 
Assessments in International Relations Theory 
	
This section will utilise the different strains of IR theory laid out in the first section to 
explore which theoretical framework most convincingly characterises state/actor 
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behaviour in Antarctic geopolitics. It will then use the most suitable framework to 
assess three key questions; whether Antarctic politics aligns with global politics or 
operates in an exclusive environment, to what extent history has influenced the 
behaviour of the three focus states in this article, and how and why changing political 
dynamics may impact China, the US and New Zealand in an Antarctic political 
environment. This synthesis of IR theory and Antarctic politics aims to make sense of 
a highly complex and salient environment, and make some recommendations around 
the ways in which state actions and motivations can be both interpreted and predicted. 
 
Which IR framework best characterises the way states interact in 
Antarctica? 	
If international relations is best understood by focusing on the distribution of power 
among states, then Realism has and will continue to make a convincing case. In 
Antarctica, ‘power’ is indeed distributed, however, it is debatable whether it remains 
the single most important motivating factor for states and actors within the system. 
Morgenthau indeed distinguished between political and military power, and different 
strands of Realism will focus on the application of one or the other (or both), but at 
its heart, Classical Realism advocates for states as unitary actors in an inherently 
anarchist environment. 86  Antarctica has seen too many examples of political 
cooperation, environmental protection, and scientific collaboration for Realism’s 
power attainment argument to be convincing. Neo-realists also advocate the role of 
the ATS as the sole mitigating factor to conflict, but on one hand this only creates a 
stronger case for Liberalism, and on the other undermines itself through the reality 
that international law and conventions are not binding and therefore have no political 
impetus. Nothing in the ATS is binding – membership and subsequent compliance is 
voluntary – which means the only genuine consequences to damaging behaviour by 
states are those imposed by other states (i.e. sanctions).87 Ultimately, the acquisition 
of power is undeniably a motivating factor for states in Antarctic politics, but it is not 
the sole motivation. The recent lobbying efforts by New Zealand and the US for the 
signing of the Ross Sea Marine Protected Area, while arguably not free of 
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geopolitical motivations, was largely driven by considerations other than the 
acquisition of power (i.e. resource protection and environmental management). 
 
If we revisit the central thrust of the Liberal argument we find a framework that 
argues while an international system without organisation is anarchic and prone to 
conflict, the effects of anarchy can be mitigated by the spread of democracy, the rule 
of international law, commerce, and institutions. 88  On the surface, Antarctic 
geopolitics provide Liberal’s case-in-point. The ATS has arguably provided the 
institutional framework in which Antarctica has been able to be preserved solely for 
scientific research and peaceful purposes. In reality, “the members of the ATS today 
draw upon a benevolent paternalism to argue that [in the commitment to their NAPs] 
they are conducting ‘science for the good of humanity’ in seeking to understand 
climate change and potentially mitigate the worst of its consequences”.89 This official 
narrative is the perfect smokescreen for Antarctic hegemons (the US, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia) to continue preserving their political interests on the 
continent. Genuine conflict is indeed yet to occur in Antarctica, but to argue that the 
ATS – a system relying on the political legitimacy which was established over 50 
years ago – is actively preventing it remains to be seen.  
 
The Liberal assumption that the spread of democracy is a central pillar of peace in 
international systems undermines the success of those countries operating in 
Antarctica who may not prescribe to the normative Western Liberal Democracy laid 
underlining the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.90 As both China and Japan continue to 
transform their roles develop their positions within both the international and 
Antarctic system, they bring with them unique interpretations of ‘socialist 
democracy’. 91  These caveats of domestic political organisation have no real 
implications to each nation’s Antarctic relations, however, for Liberals to place such 
weight in what can only be assumed as Western Liberal Democracy only becomes a 
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During section two, each state displayed a clear tendency to create foreign policy 
based on nationalist ideals. A useful description of the national identity follows: “the 
maintenance and continual reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, 
memories, myths, and traditions that form the distinctive heritage of the nation, and 
the identification of individuals with that heritage and its pattern”. 92  China’s 
construction of nationalism emerges from the perspective of historical humiliation 
has been carried through to its Antarctic relations, taking issue with the ATS as an 
‘old boys club’ and showing intimations of its ambitions to become a major Antarctic 
power.93 The United States’ longstanding projection of American exceptionalism is 
echoed throughout its foreign policy in the international system and Antarctic 
politics. The protection of American interests and general pursuit of hegemony in 
Antarctica echoes domestic sentiment around the US as being the ‘leader of the free 
world’.94 For New Zealand, ideals around international leadership are central to the 
country’s national identity. On issues of human rights and nuclear testing New 
Zealand has arguably demonstrated a moral standard towards which it hopes other 
nations could strive.95 Not dissimilarly, the country’s role in Antarctica as a nation 
undergoing high-quality science on a continent reserved for science reasserts the 
country’s nationalist ideals as an Antarctic leader. In this way, constructivist appears 
convincing in that it challenges the traditional theoretical focus on structural 
limitations. In bringing socially constructed factors like national identity into the 
analysis Constructivists are able to assess state motivations on more than just a desire 
for power.96 
 
Is Antarctic geopolitics simply a reflection of global International 
Relations? 	
In many ways, the dynamics of Antarctic politics echo those in the international 
system. A hierarchy of power exists that is not dissimilar to global politics, and trends 
in nations’ development or political decline have also had flow-on effects and thus 
been reflected in Antarctic geopolitics. A good example of this has been the rise of 
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China. In the past, China was internationally restricted due to lack of available funds 
and modern infrastructure, but now the world’s second largest economy is on the rise 
in Asia, Africa, North and South America, the Caribbean, the South Pacific, in 
Western and Eastern Europe, and Antarctica. This rise reflects the country’s growing 
political and economic power and China’s increased presence in Antarctic politics 
reflects that Antarctica is not immune to the effects and trends operating in world 
politics.97 Similarly, the Antarctic political environment reflects the global one in the 
leading role the US has assumed in power hierarchies and systems.98 The fact that the 
US considers itself a vital player in Antarctic affairs, and has been centrally involved 
in the development of the ATS and its associated organs, gives further weight to the 
idea that Antarctic geopolitics indeed reflects global international relations trends.99 
 
Conversely, there are factors that indicate the Antarctic geopolitical environment 
experiences different phenomena to the world system. The lack of conflict in 
Antarctica is a rigorously studied area yet without academic consensus as to why. 
Some parties point to the ATS as the driver of success whereby it has enabled the 
powerful to achieve their strategic wishes, and served to minimise political and 
military conflict.100 However, the UN effectively plays the same role on a larger scale 
in global politics and has not been party to the same ‘success’ as the ATS, indicating 
that the mere existence of overarching institutions is not the key to Antarctica’s 
peaceful political history. Others note that the difference between the Antarctic and 
global systems lies in NAPs increased investment to activity the region, and the 
perception that the consequences of bad behaviour will be higher (i.e. removal from 
the ATS of other agreements) than in the global system (i.e. tariffs and trade 
limitations). As a result, nations are arguably more committed to peaceful and 
constructive diplomacy in Antarctica than in the global system.101 Some cases of 
power distribution in the Antarctic political system contrast or differ from that in the 
global one. New Zealand is a good example of a minor nation in international 
politics, which by mere circumstance, operates in a significantly elevated political 
position in Antarctica.  
																																																								
97 Brady, Emerging Politics of Antarctica, p. 37; Brady, China’s Rise in Antarctica?, p. 760 
 98 Howkins, The Significance of the Frontier in Antarctic History, p. 15. 
 99 Joyner, C. (2011). United States Foreign Policy Interests in the Antarctic. The Polar Journal, 1(1), p. 
18. 
100 Rosh, Antarctica's Increasing Incorporation into the World-System, p. 122. 
101 Brady, Emerging Politics of Antarctica, p. 157. 
How has history influenced the way Antarctic states interact and perceive 
each other? 
A constructivist interpretation of Antarctic geopolitics argues that the historical 
backgrounds of actors in the Antarctic system affect state behaviour and foreign 
policy. In this way, historical events shape an actor’s perception and constructed 
reality, and as a consequence, its Antarctic aims and activity.102 Specifically, Abanti 
Bhattacharya argues, “Chinese nationalism cannot be interpreted in isolation and 
must be understood in its domestic and historical context”, due to the effect historical 
events have had on the Chinese people and its leaders, and the way they perceive 
their nation.103 As victims of imperialism, the people of China uphold sovereignty 
and integrity as supreme national interests, an approach reflected in China’s 
contemporary foreign policy.104 New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance in the mid-1980s 
also had a significant diplomatic effect that carried over into the Antarctic political 
realm. The ban on US vessels (due to their reluctance to declare nuclear materials) 
meant that American icebreakers left from Hobart, bypassing the closer and more 
feasible port in Lyttleton, and making something of a political statement at the same 
time.105 Despite thawing tensions between the US and New Zealand in more recent 
times, this political stalemate demonstrated the way diplomatic histories between 
nations can significantly affect relations in Antarctica as well. 
 
What do changing geopolitical dynamics mean for interactions between 
actors in the future? 
The most significant geopolitical questions in Antarctica will be posed by China’s 
continued rise, and how the rest of actors in the system respond to this change. 
China’s recent general foreign policies indicate a fundamental shift intended to create 
an international system favourable to itself, and one in which the United States would 
no longer be the sole super power.106 We can safely assume that China’s political 
aims in the global system mirror those in the Antarctic environment. China is also 
extremely interested in the resources in Antarctica and is eager to claim any possible 
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opportunities of resource exploration. These resources include: minerals, meteorites, 
the intellectual property of Antarctic bioprospecting, locations for scientific bases, 
marine living resources, and access to the continent for Antarctic tourism.107 China’s 
approach to resources was made clear during its negotiations for signing CCAMLR, 
as its membership did not include Hong Kong, due the city being the main base for a 
known illegally practicing national fishing company. This demonstrates China’s lack 
of genuine commitment in dealing with illegal fishing issues in the Southern 
Ocean. 108  If this approach is any indication of China’s approach to resource 
management in Antarctica, this will fly in the face of many existing national 
programs and academia, where resource extraction and distribution are virtually 
taboo subjects.109  
 
How nations like the US (and by association New Zealand) will respond to China’s 
aggressive strides in Antarctica remains to be seen. Whether the US will look to 
accommodate, contain, or cooperate with China is unclear, but America’s response to 
China’s increased international activity will undoubtedly have flow-on effects in both 
the global and Antarctic systems.110 These factors indicating change may not spell 
inevitable conflict, as Constructivists argue that international politics does not have to 
be a zero-sum game, that is, political power and influence does not have to be 
transferred in absolute terms. Ultimately China’s approach and America’s response 
will shape emerging norms, and the moderate and smaller states within the Antarctic 
system may need to adapt and develop new approaches to diplomacy depending on 
the outcome of this impending power struggle.  
Conclusion 
	
This article has sought to explore the ways in which international relations theory can 
aid in explaining and assessing the behaviour of actors within Antarctic geopolitics. 
There is little doubt that “the ATS has proved remarkably successful in preserving 
peace, promoting science, and protecting the environment in the Southern Continent” 
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to date; however, emerging Asian powers alongside the recognition that the ATS 
ultimately props up historical, colonial, and liberal democratic ideals, may spell at 
best a shift in the current hierarchy of power and at worst open conflict in 
Antarctica’s famously peaceful realm.111 Through a selective examination of the 
dominant strains of IR theory, an analysis of the recent foreign policy in Antarctica 
by China, the US, and New Zealand, and a synthesis of IR theory and key Antarctic 
geopolitical discussions has informed the debate through an ultimately Constructivist 
framework. Ultimately, the addition of international relations traditions to the 
geopolitics of Antarctica has provided a distinct lens through which to analyse state 
behaviour on the world’s fifth largest continent, and allowed unique conclusions to be 
drawn. Constructivists have faith that changing dynamic politics around human 
activity and science in Antarctica will not spell inevitable conflict due to social 
constructions of nationalism and identity encouraging harmony among Treaty 
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